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We thank all our commentators for engaging so encour-
agingly with a proposal that many would regard as sim-
ply too radical to consider seriously pursing in practice.
In the spirit of encouraging further debate and develop-
ing our proposal further, we respond to their lines of
inquiry by addressing five kinds of criticism.
The first criticism questions the likelihood that the
vaccine experiments will produce benefits either for apes
or for humans. Specifically, Addison and Malone (2018)
question the value of nonhuman primates as models for
human biology and point out that the Ebola virus mutates
often, so the “suitability” of any vaccine is questioned.
The value of vaccine development generally, however,
seems to be supported by the use of ring vaccination with
Merck rVSV, in humans known to have been exposed to
the Zaire strain of Ebola, implemented twice already dur-
ing 2018 in separate outbreaks in the Democratic Republic
of Congo. Its longevity and efficacy as an intervention are
indeed yet to be determined; we see this as another rea-
son to pursue a pipeline of different approaches to find
out. More ecological and sero-prevalence work is needed
to discover the natural reservoirs of Ebola virus (Afolabi
and Afolabi 2018), but more surveillance is helping pre-
dict how outbreaks will spread and where future out-
breaks are likely. The EcoHealth Alliance’s PREDICT
program continues to help in this regard.
The flip side of the first criticism, the second kind of
criticism suggests that the experiments with wild apes
are riskier than we let on. For example, Addison and
Malone (2018) say that it is unclear how well administra-
tion of the vaccine could be realized by noninvasive
means, that risk factors may interact, and combined pose
a greater risk than each taken independently (experiment
too risky). Human involvement in experimental vaccine
administration and observation could have foreseen and
unforeseen negative consequences. More human encoun-
ters with apes might decrease the apes’ fear of humans
and lead to more human–ape encounters, and maybe
more Ebola. Furthermore, the vaccine may negatively
impact target species either through vaccine-related
effects or through stress (Gruen 2018).
Whether or not the potential benefits outweigh the
very real risks in this experiment is up for debate. The
commentaries have identified risks and benefits that we
had not previously considered, and these and others
should be seriously considered if proposals like the one
we discuss go forward. One thing to consider even
before making this assessment is whether we think of
risk as a threshold requirement or relative requirement.
By this we mean: Do the risks cross some threshold
(such as violating animals’ rights or integrity) such that
no amount of benefit would justify risk exposure? Or,
should we ask instead: Do the risks outweigh the bene-
fits? One’s answer to this question informs the analysis.
If we think of risk as a threshold requirement, we will
argue that no amount of benefit is enough. If we think
of risk as a relative requirement, we will think that the
benefits must outweigh the risks. This means that
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despite the very real risks of moving forward with this
proposal, these are outweighed by potential benefits,
and, all things considered, it is permissible to move
ahead. We would not want to take sides here, only to
make a further point about the relationship between ben-
efits and risks in the moral evaluation of ani-
mal research.
The third kind of criticism lies in our apparent
inattention to other ways of mitigating the risk of Ebola
to apes and humans, especially those that highlight
humans’ role in increasing infectious disease risks, like
deforestation, hunting, and anthropogenic climate
change (Addison and Malone 2018; Gruen 2018).
Nothing in our proposal or analysis supports either the
assertion that vaccine development is the only way to
mitigate risk of Ebola for apes and humans, or the asser-
tion that it is the best way of doing so. We fully agree
with the commentators that other, more ethical and
effective, ways of mitigating Ebola risk ought to be ser-
iously considered, and, if practically and politically feas-
ible, pursued in our common goal of mitigating the risks
of infectious diseases. We have no doubt that under-
standing and making incremental progress toward allevi-
ating deforestation, urbanization, the need for hunting,
and other problems would likely have an impact on
Ebola transmission—not to mention mean that more
humans’ and animals’ rights would be respected, that
more people would lead dignified lives. At the same
time, vaccines may be part of the Ebola-reduction strat-
egy, one that might offer quicker and more politically
acceptable solutions to the global ecological problems of
our age. Addressing the myriad issues that contribute to
infectious diseases may provide an overall greater net
benefit. But we don’t know that. Might vaccines provide
benefit? The point of our article is: Should we even do
the experiments to find out? We argued that we should.
The fourth kind of criticism suggests that our pro-
posal is insensitive to power dynamics and the import-
ance of partnership in the vaccine development and risk
management process. While our proposal did not expli-
citly account for local involvement in the design of the
research, or in the decision to go ahead with it, we agree
with commentators that this should happen. Being aware
of the power dynamics, political concerns, and legal
mandates for decision making is incredibly important.
Under International Health Regulations, national govern-
ments are advised by the World Health Organization in
the preparation of human outbreaks. Vaccine developers
are always going to be concerned with, if not entirely
motivated by, profit (Afolabi and Afolabi 2018). The best
we can do is to hold them accountable to and encourage
consideration of competing interests. In the context of
experiments with wild apes, other stakeholders, local,
regional, and international, will also need input. For
example, the World Conservation Society continues to
engage with indigenous hunter-gathering communities
to help estimate the numbers of gorillas and
chimpanzees killed for food, out of which the numbers
of apes exposed to the Ebola virus can be determined
from donated carcasses. Radical behavior change of
hunter gathers may be unlikely in the near future, but
local community engagement is already being tested
through ongoing human trials of vaccines and now of
treatments, as well as through ecological sero-prevalence
studies in animals and humans.
The fifth kind of criticism we see as deepening our
theoretical understanding of the One Health framework,
rather than opposing our proposal as such. We thank
Lederman and Capps (2018) for articulating the One
Health ethic perhaps more deeply than we did, and for
the prior work on which we drew for the article. They
offer important theoretical considerations about how we
should conceive of the ultimate good we are aiming for
in developing a public health ethic, an environmental
ethic, or a research ethic. Is it “the greatest good for the
greatest number of creatures” or “universal goods” or
something else altogether? Although this may not matter
much to the defense of the proposal, it matters a lot to
framing the issue and articulating a common purpose
and goal that unite public health and environmental eth-
ics in a really beautiful way.
In closing, we hope that any experiment that goes
forward will do so cautiously, carefully, and with eyes
wide open about foreseeable consequences. On the other
hand, respecting all partners in the experiment (humans
and animals) also means stopping if foreseeable negative
consequences and unjust risk/benefit arrangements are
unavoidable. We remain open to both of these possibil-
ities. The best we can hope for is that the approach
explored in our article chips away at what Dr. Rollin so
nicely articulated: “the cavalier disregard we display for
the lives and, more importantly, the quality of lives of
those creatures upon whom we depend in so many
ways” (Rollin 2018). We couldn’t have put it better our-
selves. 
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